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ABSTRACT  
There is a broad consensus among social and economic researchers that ‘institutions’ matter. 
Institutions influence beliefs, norms and actions; thus they shape performance and outcomes. 
Interestingly, the concept of institutions is not well established in construction economics or 
management research, specifically in waste-related literature. This paper presents discussions 
on the impact of imperfect regulations, norms and cultural/cognitive assumptions that exist 
within the construction procurement context, and how this has translated into the 
institutionalisation of wasteful behaviours and practices in construction projects. Based on a 
critical review of extant literature, the ultimate objectives of this study are to: (1) contribute 
to the overall understanding of waste in construction by suggesting a novel perspective to the 
generation and persistence of waste in construction projects; (2) demonstrate how the neo-
institutional theory, a branch of organizational sociology, can potentially be applied as an 
analytical lens to deliver a more explicit theory of waste that relates cause and effect within 
the wider aspects of construction procurement systems and relationships; (3) highlight a 
number of widely accepted regulations, norms and meanings that impede efficiency and 
improvement efforts in construction; and (4) formulate propositions on institutional waste in 
the process of construction procurement that will be fundamental to the future trajectory of 
this study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely accepted that there is considerable waste in the end-to-end design, construction 
and facility management process. Over the past sixty years the industry has commissioned 
several reports with the aim of reviewing its performance and suggesting means of 
improvement. Of these, the Egan report, ‘Rethinking Construction’, was produced in 1998 to 
address concerns raised by clients engaging services of construction companies; and was 
followed by the ‘Never Waste A Good Crisis’ report published by construction excellence in 
2009 to review the subsequent progress. The former report sent a clear message to the 
construction industry by stressing that: 
 
“Recent studies in the USA, Scandinavia and this country suggest that up to 30% of 
construction is rework, labor is used at only 40-60% of potential efficiency, accidents 
can account for 3-6% of total project costs, and at least 10% of materials are 
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wasted…The message is clear - there is plenty of scope for improving efficiency and 
quality simply by taking waste out of construction” (Egan, 1998, p.15). 
 
Empirical evidence points to waste in excess of 50% of construction time (Figure 1), where 
waste is defined as anything that is not required to create value for the customer/client or end-
user. This is primarily process waste with some physical waste. The fact that much of this 
waste is common to many projects suggests that there are imperfect systems and structural 
arrangements that support and/or encourage wasteful activities. To say that waste is created 
due to human error is unhelpful; blame arguably fails to facilitate learning to ‘do better’ and 
similarly fails to lead us towards effective methods of reduction or prevention. As Dr Deming 
taught us: ‘94% of troubles and failures are attributed to the system (responsibility of 
management), 6% are due to special cases (such as human mistake)’ (Deming, 1984, p. 315). 
Human behaviour is always influenced by the environment in which it takes place (i.e. 
broader organisational system or institutional environment). Without a deep understanding of 
the economic, social and environmental issues contributing to poor decision-making, it is 
very likely that similar flawed or risky decisions will recur. For this reason, Levensen (2011) 
emphasises that: ‘Without changing the environment, human error cannot be reduced for 
long. We design systems in which human error is inevitable and then blame the human and 
not the system design' (p. 61). 
Figure 1: Analysis and examples of waste in construction. Proportions based on studies by 
Diekmann et al. (2004) in the US and unpublished studies in the UK by Cameron Orr, AWD 
and Construction excellence as cited by Mossman (2009). Diagram adopted and modified 
from Mossman (2009) 
 
The UK Government has recently created a set of challenging construction targets for 2025 
(HM Government, 2013). These include a 50% faster delivery, 50% lower emissions, and a 
33% reduction of clients' capital costs – business as usual won't meet this target. There is no 
doubt that eliminating (process and physical) waste from construction design and delivery is 
a necessary step towards achieving these goals. There is also no doubt that the adoption of 
lean production theories into construction has helped to understand and identify many of the 
causes and origins of waste in construction projects, in particular at the project delivery 
(production) phase. However, the prevailing understanding of waste, arguably, encourages 
the improvement of current processes rather than fundamental system redesign. Obtaining a 
better understanding and conceptualisation of waste in construction is therefore becoming 
more crucial to prepare the industry for the radical change demanded.  
 
CONCEPTUALISATION OF WASTE IN CONSTRUCTION 
The formal adaptation and transfer of the new production philosophies into construction 
projects has been ongoing since the early 1990’s (Koskela, 1992). These philosophies were 
characterised as “lean” from the study of Toyota (Krafcik, 1988), and the term ‘Lean 
Construction’ rose to prominence with the formation of the International Group for Lean 
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Construction1 in 1993. The concept of lean was formally recommended to the UK 
construction industry by a Government report (Egan, 1998). Traditionally, the term 'waste in 
construction' is usually limited or intuitively linked to physical (material) waste. The concept 
of material waste in construction has been widely addressed but the widened understanding 
introduced by the seven process wastes identified in the Toyota Production System (TPS) 
(Ohno, 1988) has struggled to be transferred. Process waste is directly associated with 
executing tasks and conforms to the current understanding of project management as ‘a 
specific set of operations designed to accomplish a singular goal’ (Project Management 
Institute2). In this way, production is defined as transforming resources towards the finished 
product or project and waste can be seen as the inefficient use of resources in the execution of 
tasks. The disadvantage of this understanding of waste is that it drives the improvement of 
current processes rather than radical new system design.  
 
Koskela (2000) advances the definition of lean production to the combination of 
transformation tasks (T), flow (F) and value creation (V). This definition of production as 
TFV creates two additional dimensions to the conceptualisation of waste as the inefficient use 
of resources in tasks. The first additional TFV dimension, flow (F), reveals the 
interdependency of activities across the whole project process. The consideration of flow 
brings the supply chain and the logistics of getting resources to the point of transformation 
into focus. Elevating flow to a project production driver also alters the classification of 
process waste within tasks. For example, waiting within one task may now be necessary to 
expedite tasks downstream – this waiting is therefore no longer a waste and results in one 
task being sub-optimised in order to optimise the project. Consequently the pursuit of waste 
within transformation activities can itself become a cause of waste if it disrupts flow. Erratic 
and disrupted flow of processes provide further sources likely to cause waste recognised 
within TPS in two ways - the unevenness of workflow (Mura) and the related concept of the 
overburden of capacity (Muri) (Liker, 2004). 
 
The second additional TFV dimension is created by considering value creation (V) and brings 
the customer into focus. The construction sector typically identifies clients and more recently 
users and stakeholders – the term customer is not commonly used. However, the inclusion of 
value creation into project production moves the conceptualisation of waste towards 
identifying what causes value-loss and questions from whose perspective. This 
conceptualisation will vary from project to project and from customer to customer meaning 
the understanding of what constitutes value and how it is created becomes an important part 
of the design of the project production system (delivery including logistics, design and 
procurement) and the project product (the physical facility or asset created and what it 
achieves). One aspect of this conceptualisation is the consideration of the organisational, 
commercial and institutional environments that surround the design and delivery of 
construction projects. It is this aspect that leads to the primary research question:  
 
                                                          
1 www.iglc.net 
2 www.pmi.org 
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'Is there anything in the commercial and institutional environments surrounding 
construction that is blocking radical new production system design and therefore 
pinning the prevailing wasteful system in place?’  
 
The understanding of value and value loss (or waste) within these wider organisational, 
commercial and institutional environments is more difficult to determine not least because it 
requires a critical evaluation of the activities of different professions, for example lawyers, 
accountants, human resource managers, quantity surveyors to name a few. These 
environments and the professions within them also exhibit varying cultures, structures, 
systems and behaviours. Such an evaluation also needs to draw upon theory from disciplines 
outside both construction and manufacturing such as economics, law and sociology if it is to 
begin to explain the coherence and yet wastefulness of the current approaches to construction 
projects. 
 
 A contemporary study by Sarhan et al. (2017) reviewed the governance problems 
confronting clients and decision makers in construction procurement through the lens of 
Transaction Cost Economics. Their work led to novel explanations so as to why wasteful 
procurement practices persist, through an economic perspective. However, this study argues 
that an institutional perspective has the potential to add useful insights. Institutional theory 
gives significant consideration to context. It could also help to reveal the underlying 
fundamental paradigms that influence early project decisions and thus shape project 
performance and outcomes. 
 
An empirical study by Wearne (2014) reviewed the problems of project management as 
reported by 1,879 individuals employed in the construction, manufacturing, process, and 
service industries in North-West Europe over 23 years. Interestingly when reviewing the data 
collected, the same categories of problems appeared to remain the main concern of project 
management. In an attempt to find answers so as to why many categories of project 
management problems persist, the analysis of his study reported that: 
 “More than 75% of the problems reported by the participants are due to institutional 
practices within organizations rather than inherent in their projects. Many of these 
problems of project management could therefore be avoided, or at least reduced by 
early attention to their causes. As a result much of what is called “fire- fighting” in 
project management—urgent actions on problems that should not have been allowed 
to occur—could be prevented” (Wearne, 2014, p. 72).  
 
The findings of Wearne’s (2014) empirical study support recent arguments for improvement 
in the “front end” decisions on project objectives, plans and governance arrangements (for 
example, see Edkins et al., 2012). This reinforces the need to investigate the institutional 
factors that influence early-project decisions and condition project procurement and 
governance arrangements. In the construction management literature, there are very few, if 
any, studies that have sought to explore the relationship between institutional factors 
influencing construction procurement choices and practices, and waste in construction 
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projects. Therefore, this study examines the current commercial and institutional arrangement 
within construction procurement and attempts to analyse them through the lens of 
Institutional theory. The study starts by providing a brief overview of the concept of waste-
reduction in construction. Following this, the study illustrates the significance of 
conceptualising construction procurement systems as institutional arrangements. Next, the 
study reviews behavioural explanations provided by Institutional theory of organisational 
studies. Subsequently, the study demonstrates how the neo-institutional theory, a branch of 
organizational sociology, has the potential to be used as an analytical lens to deliver a more 
explicit theory of waste relating cause and effect within the wider aspects of construction 
procurement systems and relationships. The term 'waste' is almost always synonymous with 
physical waste (i.e. on-site material waste). However, throughout the following sections of 
this paper, the term 'waste' refers to the wider conceptualisation of waste as summarised 
above. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
This study hopes to shed light on a source of waste hitherto unacknowledged in construction. 
This, therefore, requires an in-depth review of selected relevant literature, with the intension 
of searching for latent themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This interpretative work entails a 
thorough review of the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualisations informing the 
content of the data. For this reason, a generic purposive sampling strategy (Bryman, 2012) 
was adopted for literature review. This strategy is not driven by the statistical imperative of 
including every available study. Instead, it puts the research questions under investigation at 
the forefront of sampling considerations (Bryman, 2012). According to Doyle (2003, p. 326), 
a purposive sample is more appropriate than an exhaustive one, when the aim is explanation 
rather than prediction. Through this approach, the researcher decides what needs to be 
known, and deliberately chooses suitable literature which can potentially provide the most 
relevant information and have the largest impact on the enhancement of knowledge (Patton, 
2015, p.276).   
 
Based on these considerations, the study targeted peer-reviewed papers published by top 
journals using electronic search engines (e.g. University's Library OneSearch and Google 
Scholar) and hand-searching of peer-reviewed papers published by proceedings of the Annual 
Conference of the International Group for Lean Construction (IGLC). The main keywords 
and topics that were searched for and reviewed included: waste-minimisation in construction, 
wasteful attitudes and behaviours in construction projects, opportunistic practices, omission 
errors, conflicts and disputes, relationship between procurement and value loss, hidden 
transaction costs in construction projects, barriers to partnering, barriers to relational forms of 
contracting, barriers to lean and integrated project delivery, and changing roles of clients and 
professional service providers. As a result of this effort, 35 waste-related studies and 76 
construction procurement and contractual related articles, ranging from 1994 to 2017, were 
identified and thoroughly reviewed. When qualitatively analysing the articles, a table of 
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information, that categorises information extracted from each paper, was created to help the 
authors with organising their thoughts (See Appendix 1). 
 
THE CONCEPT OF WASTE-REDUCTION IN CONSTRUCTION  
The concept of waste-reduction has been fundamentally used as a key driver for improvement 
in the manufacturing industry, and arguably led to great achievements; but it has not been as 
prevalent in construction economics or management (Koskela and Ballard, 2012; Koskela et 
al., 2012; Bølviken and Koskela, 2016). Research efforts aimed at understanding waste are 
relatively limited when compared to other topics in construction, and many waste-related 
studies continue to focus on the causes rather than the root causes. Two subsequent 
systematic literature reviews on empirical studies that relate to waste-minimisation in 
construction (Viana et al., 2012; Formoso et al., 2015) revealed that research is broadly 
focused on addressing three different categories of waste:  
(1) Construction material waste (physical waste);  
(2) Specific sorts of waste (such as accidents and rework). 
(3) Non value-adding activities (process waste); 
Many studies in construction literature have concentrated on ‘waste-management’ strategies 
and implementation efforts on construction project sites (for example, Peng et al., 1997; 
Mcdonald and Smithers, 1998; Lawson et al., 2001). These studies have broadly focused on 
identifying and assessing strategies for re-using and recycling construction material waste, 
waste-quantification, waste management mapping to help with the handling of on-site waste, 
investigating the impact of legislation on waste management practices, suggesting 
improvements in on-site waste management practices, and developing on-site waste auditing 
and assessment tools (Osmani, 2012). The current approaches to research in the field of 
construction waste-minimisation are mainly focused on designing out waste (e.g. Keys et al., 
2000); waste minimisation guides for architects and designers (e.g. WRAP, 2009); attitudes, 
perceptions and behavioural factors  towards construction waste minimisation (e.g. Osmani et 
al., 2008; Begum et al., 2009); the need for improved supply chain integration (e.g. Dainty 
and Brooke, 2004), and procurement waste minimisation strategies (Gamage et al, 2009).  
 
There are also some other research studies that have focused on specific types of waste such 
as: rework and design error reduction (e.g. Busby and Hughes, 2004; Love et al., 2009, 
2011a, 2013; Feng and Tommelein, 2009) knowledge flow and integration in different 
construction working environments (e.g. Ruan et al., 2012), designing for construction 
worker safety (e.g. Toole and Gambatese, 2008), reducing waste by appropriate coordination 
mechanisms (Sandberg and Bildsten, 2011), and project disputes causations (Love et al., 
2011b; Mitropoulos and Howell, 2001). However, most of the studies that have investigated 
process waste and non-value adding activities have been undertaken by members of the lean 
construction community. There are many general classifications of process waste as defined 
in lean thinking. For example, they include Tachii Ohno’s seven wastes: transportation, 
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inventory, motion, waiting, over-production, over-processing, and defects (Ohno 1988, pp. 
19-20). In addition, the waste of human potential - e.g. ‘Not speaking, not listening’ by 
Macomber & Howel (2004), and the ‘Making-do’ waste presented by Koskela (2004) is 
included within this category. 
 
An overall analysis of waste-related literature in construction reveals five critical issues. First, 
researchers have gradually shifted their attention and studies from a mere focus on waste-
management strategies that have mainly been concerned with the consequences of waste, to 
the promotion of waste-minimisation strategies, as a more sustainable approach that 
eliminates or reduces construction material waste at its source. Secondly, most of these 
waste-minimisation approaches, if not all, were directed towards finding means for reducing 
construction material waste (physical waste) as opposed to process waste. Other important 
issues such as time waste and value creation are much less explicitly explored.  
 
Thirdly, there is no doubt that many of the problems that lead to the occurrence of waste in 
construction are strongly related to lean theories adopted in production management. 
However, it can still be argued that waste is created primarily from project-organisational and 
contractual problems (Williamson, 1991, pp.78-79); and as such, a focus on waste reduction 
in site-based production alone would be insufficient. As emphasised by Matthews et al. 
(2003), it is difficult to maximise value and minimise waste at the project level if the 
prevailing contractual structure hinders coordination, constrains collaboration and innovation, 
and sub-optimises performance and goals. Similarly, this study argues that procurement 
systems, as institutional arrangements, are designed to assign liabilities and authorities to 
people and organizations (Love et al., 1998) at the project and programme levels; and thus 
structure the borders that shape ‘the play of the game’ (Williamson, 2000). From a production 
management perspective, organisation and contracts are essential parts of the production 
system design; and thus there is no doubt that poorly aligned (imperfect) organisational and 
institutional arrangements may cause waste and impact on project outcomes (Koskela and 
Ballard, 2012).  Fourthly, a small but growing number of studies have attempted to 
investigate the influence of procurement processes on the generation of waste in construction 
projects (e.g. Jaques, 2000; Gamage et al., 2009). However all of these studies have only 
focused on the relationship between different procurement systems and the generation of 
construction material waste.  
 
Finally, very limited, if any, waste-related studies have devoted attention to exploring 
performance-shaping mechanisms (i.e. systems and structural arrangements), as well as the 
institutional context in which human actions and decisions are constituted. In the construction 
management literature, there are hardly any studies that have sought to investigate the role 
played by institutional processes, within the construction procurement context, in embedding 
waste in construction projects. Waste here can be in the form of monetary, time or effort and 
can pre or post contract stages.  
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THE CONSTRUCTION PROCUREMENT CONTEXT 
Construction Procurement Systems 
A common theme of construction literature is the proliferation of definitions of a 
procurement system (See for e.g. Sharif and Morledge, 1994; Love et al., 1998; Masterman, 
2002; Watermeyer, 2012). Both terms: `contractual arrangement’ and `procurement system’ 
are often used synonymously (Love et al., 1998). Similarly, procurement approaches and 
additional contract price provisions (e.g. lump sum, guaranteed maximum price, target cost, 
cost plus) are also commonly regarded as closely related (Oyegoke et al., 2009). 
Interestingly, a study by Tookey et al. (2001) found that, in industrial practice, clients usually 
make amendments to mitigate risk and add usability to rigidly prescribed procurement 
systems that are imposed, in their view, by researchers and consultants when classifying 
procurement routes. For convenience, the definition adopted here is that a construction 
procurement system is  a 'project-organisation system that arranges and governs the way that 
the parties involved can compete and/or cooperate in order to achieve their agreed 
programme and project goals’. Inspired by  Masterman’s (2002) forth-fold of procurement 
methods, Love et al's (1998) categorization of building procurement systems, Kumrasawy 
and Dissanayaka's (1998) hierarchy or procurement options, and Watermeyer's (2011) 
framework for developing a construction procurement strategy, this study further 
conceptualises major construction procurement arrangements as shown in Figure 2, and Table 
1 below.  
Figure 2: Major construction procurement systems and sub-systems 
 
Construction Procurement Subsystems and Options 
Procurement subsystems or/and procedures are identical terms that are commonly used in 
literature. Previous studies have integrated specific procurement sub-systems to their 
hierarchy of procurement systems, when investigating the relationship between procurement 
systems, project parameters, and certain aspects of project-performance such as: time, cost, 
quality, work environment, and innovation (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka, 1998; Love, 
2002; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Eriksson and Westerberg, 2011). For example, the main 
procurement sub-systems conceptualised by Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka (1998) are: 
work packages; functional groupings (i.e. separated, integrated and management-led); 
payment modalities; standard sets of contract forms or conditions; and selection 
methodologies. Similarly, Watermeyer (2012) suggested that procurement and contracting 
arrangements comprise: procurement selection strategy; procurement evaluation strategy; 
contracting strategy (functional groupings); pricing strategy; and form of contract.  
 
In a conceptual study by Eriksson and Westerberg (2011) which developed a hypothetical 
procurement framework that examines how various procurement-related factors affect project 
performance criteria, procurement procedures at the buying stage were divided into three 
categories according to their relation to: competition, co-opetition and cooperation. These 
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procurement procedures consisted of: design; tendering; bid evaluation, subcontractor 
selection; payment; use of collaborative tools; and performance evaluation. Thus, for 
instance, subcontractors’ selection-decisions made by either the contractor or the client would 
be related to competitive procurement procedures; joint selection with single responsibility 
would be a co-opetitive procedure; while joint selection with shared responsibilities would be 
regarded as cooperative.  
 
Compellingly, very limited studies in construction management have explicitly considered 
and integrated, as part of their hierarchy of procurement systems, other critical procurement 
subsystems such as: insurance arrangements, bonds, collateral warranties, and alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, despite their significant importance and influence on project-
teamwork performance. Building on the work of Wordley (1991); Kumaraswamy and 
Dissanayaka (1998), Love et al. (1998); Hughes et al (2000); Sherif and kaka (2003); 
Eriksson and Laan (2007); Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011); Masterman (2011), 
Eriksson and Westerberg (2011); Mante et al. (2012); Ndekugri et al. (2013); and Pasquire et 
al., (2015), Table 1, provides the major options available within procurement sub-systems, as 
conceptualised within this study. 
Table 1: Major options available within construction procurement subsystems 
Procurement subsystem 
/Procedure 
Possible Options 
Work packaging 
 Break down based on contract value (e.g. large packaging to be 
employed for the purpose of high price competition, or small 
packaging if specialist expertise is required) 
 Divisions based on geographical divisions or functional and 
disciplinary divisions of contracts 
 Design based on sequence or interdependence of activities 
 Design based on Project risks and the allocation of 
responsibilities, or project needs 
Form of contracts  
 Standard un-amended set of contract forms and conditions from 
recognised bodies (e.g. FIDIC, NEC3, ICE, JCT,  contracts)   
 Amended standard forms of contract which include special 
conditions of contract (e.g. special risk transfer/allocation, length 
of guarantee and additional insurance) 
 Multi-party agreement forms of contract (e.g. PPC2000) 
 Discrete/Bespoke contracts (custom-made)  
Selection methodologies 
(Bid-evaluations) 
 High weight on tender price  
 Equal weight on price and soft parameters  
 High weight on soft parameters (e.g. competence, reputation, 
capacity, collaborative-ability, and experience) 
Payment mechanism  
 Advanced payments 
 Milestone payments 
 Interim payments (e.g. Monthly payments) 
 Stage payments 
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 Incentive/disincentive payments 
 Shared gain/pain arrangements/Target cost  
Insurance systems  
 Traditional insurance arrangements;  
 Single project-insurance option 
Warranties  
 Collateral warranties; or  
 latent defect insurance 
Tendering approach  
 
 Competitive open bid procedures with or without post-
qualifications (one or two stage tendering);  
 Selected- limited bid invitation - with or without pre-
qualifications; (one or two-stage tendering)  
 Direct negotiation with one preferred supplier (no tender) 
Pricing strategy 
 Price-based (e.g. Lump sum; Guaranteed maximum price; Bills 
of quantities; Price list/schedule; Activity-based scheduling) 
 Cost-based (e.g. cost-reimbursement; Target cost; and Target 
value design) 
 Mixed 
Performance evaluation 
mechanisms  
 Output control by client - inspection of the outcome 
 Process control by client - ongoing monitoring 
 Social control - Self-control by contractor  
Strategy for achieving 
‘Secondary Objectives’  
(e.g.  promoting 
sustainability, enhancing 
health and safety 
performance beyond 
statutory requirements, and 
poverty alleviation) 
 Through the use of incentives that are provided in the form of 
tender evaluation points 
 Through financial incentives for attaining key performance 
indicators  
 Via contractual obligations and mandatory subcontracting 
requirements 
Dispute resolution 
mechanisms (DRM) 
 Conventional DRMs (i.e. litigation, arbitration, adjudication) 
 Alternative DRMs (e.g. Mediation, conciliation, early neutral 
evaluation, Partnering) 
Bondings / Safeguarding 
approaches 
 Performance/Surety bonds  
 Bank Guarantees  
 Standby letters of credit  
 Cash retentions  
 Parent company guarantee 
 No need for use of bonds as a means of safeguarding - Instead the 
focus is on pre-qualifications, direct negotiation, single project 
insurance and  collaborative/relation-based delivery approaches 
 
There is no doubt that the deployment of efficient procurement arrangements (i.e. 
procurement systems, sub-systems and options) may increase the likelihoods of ’project 
success’ and overall client satisfaction in a particular project context (Kumaraswamy and 
Dissanayak, 1998). However, in order to optimise the whole, it is important to consider the 
influence of the interactions between the sub-systems on the output of the main procurement 
system (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayak, 1998). It is also critical to ensure the compatibility 
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of the chosen procurement options from within each sub-system with the selected project 
delivery system, client and project needs, and other contextual conditions that bear on the 
project (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayak, 1998). For instance, it may be unsuitable to choose a 
cost-reimbursement pricing option for a traditionally procured project (Love et al., 1998). 
Similarly, it would be inefficient to adapt a bid evaluation strategy based on lowest tender 
price for the selection of project team members of a partnering project (Eriksson et al., 2008). 
Thus, it is suggested that procurement arrangements should be crafted to support production 
system requirements and improve flow processes, rather than being based on cost and risk-
averse considerations that may lead to sub-optimisation (Sarhan et al., 2017). The premise 
here is based on 'optimising the whole' rather than 'optimising the parts'.  
 
Based on these arguments, it is thus ironic how that an empirical survey (Zaghloul and 
Hartman, 2003), that was conducted in the Canadian and the United States construction 
industries, revealed that  inappropriate risk allocation through disclaimer (exculpatory) 
clauses in contracts is still the general traditional practice in the construction industry; and 
that their use is prevalent to an extent that they continue to be utilized in some of the newer 
contractual agreements such as partnering/alliances. Similarly, it is interesting that the clients 
of many projects that have been procured using an integrated project delivery (IPD) system 
still rely on the use of performance/surety bonds and traditional insurance arrangements, 
despite the latter in particular being identified by leading industry professionals in the US as 
one of the biggest worries for the adoption of IPD to its full capacity (Kent, and Becerik-
Gerber, 2010; Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 2011). That is because it was found that 
traditional insurance products impose liability issues on each project-party separately and 
thus make collaboration complicated. The same has been asserted by expert construction 
professionals in the UK who suggested that conventional arrangements for providing 
insurance cover add unnecessary costs to constructions projects, and can also obstruct 
collaboration between supply chains (Ndekugri et al., 2013). According to Mossman et al. 
(2010, p. 11)  
 
"If each party to a relational agreement is required to have its own insurance and 
there is a claim during design or construction, an insurance company could force 
parties to sue one another in order to trigger insurance coverage, threatening 
relationships".  
 
These examples suggest the existence of serious power disparities within the construction 
market place; this in turn allows actors with power, and who may have vested interests for the 
wide-spread use of some imperfect procurement arrangements, to dictate the rules of the 
game - the way we do business. Winch (2000a), suggested a number of different factors, yet 
often working in combination, that could allow some actors in a business system to become 
relatively powerful compared to others. These were identified by him as those possessing the 
following capabilities: 
* Corresponding author: Ssarhan@lincoln.ac.uk 
 Ability to solve complex problems for the client - e.g. the traditional role of the architect 
and the consultant engineer in the British system which provides them with the privilege 
to solve complex problems for the client through the briefing process. 
 The blessing of the state (e.g. statutory protection) - For instance, in many countries (e.g. 
France and Germany) only the architect can apply for building permissions. 
 Ability to manage risk for the client - This includes control actors, such as the quantity 
surveyor, in the UK, whose role was developed to mediate the power of the general 
contractor on behalf of the client. 
 
The Significance of Procurement as Institutional Arrangements 
Construction business systems are regarded as institutions (Winch, 2000a&b; Sha, 2004) that 
are created in countries to specify ‘the rules of the game’, and regulate the relations and 
interactions between the different parties involved in the industry. The evolution of these 
business systems are path dependent and also heavily reliant on the cultural and regulative 
context within each country (Sha, 2004; Matos-Castano et al., 2014). In other words, the 
national context leads to the formation of specific business systems which in turn influence 
the orientation, strategies and performance of individual firms in nationally distinctive ways 
(Winch, 2000a). Similarly, this study argues that procurement systems, as institutional 
arrangements, are designed to assign liabilities and authorities to people and organizations 
(Love et al., 1998) at the programme and project levels; and thus structure the boarders that 
shape ‘the play of the game’ (Williamson, 2000). Inappropriate procurement arrangements 
may lead to time and cost overruns, adversarial relationships between project parties, and 
ultimately the failure of projects (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka, 1998; Mante et al., 2012; 
Watermeyer, 2012). Thus, there is a wide agreement among scholars and many clients on the 
fact that getting the construction procurement context right is central to project success 
(Latham, 1994; Love et al., 1998; Tookey et al., 2001; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Osipova and 
Eriksson, 2011).  
 
The construction industry has, over a long period, been subject to substantial criticism for its 
opportunistic relationships, with conflicts and disputes, and lack of trust, collaboration and 
customer focus often cited as significant amongst its various shortcomings (Egan; 1998; 
Rooke et al., 2003; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Love et al., 2010). Hence, traditional 
procurement arrangements (e.g. separated methods) are potential root causes for the 
opportunism and lack of cooperation that characterise many construction projects (Eriksson 
and Laan, 2007; Osipova and Eriksson, 2011), the industry has been urged to start using new 
and less familiar procurement systems (e.g. partnering and alliancing) that are believed to be 
capable of enhancing collaboration, commitment and trust between project parties (Egan, 
1998). However, despite the strong advocacy for the use of partnering and of the potential 
benefits that it could attain, its implementation in the construction industry generally remains 
patchy rather than widespread (Phua, 2006; Eriksson et al., 2008). The same applies to other 
innovative delivery approaches such as the integrated project delivery (IPD) system (Kent 
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and Becerik-Gerber, 2010). It is thus questionable why traditional procurement arrangements 
still remain very prevalent in the construction industry (RICS, 2004; CIOB, 2010; RIBA, 
2013), and have not, yet, been replaced by more collaborative/relation-based procurement 
arrangements (e.g. partnering and framework agreements) that are deemed to be more 
efficient. Even when partnering is utilised, the relationship between contractors and 
subcontractors is often regarded as ‘mere ceremony’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and aimed at 
signalling legitimacy to key observers (Greenwood, 2001). Thus, this is a fundamental 
question since there are substantial trends towards cooperative ways of working as a means 
for improving project performance and outcomes. A number of theoretical perceptions exist 
in literature to predict and explain the reasons for the establishment, process and outcomes of 
several forms of institutional and organisational arrangements. Out of these, three principal 
theories seem to provide profound conceptual insights:  
1. Transaction cost economics (TCE) (see Williamson, 1975, 1985);   
2. Resource-dependence Theory (RDT) (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); and 
3. Neo-institutional theory of organisational studies (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2005).  
 
A common conceptual assumption amongst all is that social or economic actors make 
rational, albeit bounded, and purposive decisions about the types of contractual and 
organisational arrangements, that they would form or join, depending on what they conceive 
to be most beneficial (Phua, 2006). However, it is important to realise that not all institutional 
and organisational arrangements are cost-based (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). For instance, 
the theory of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in contrast to TCE and 
RDT, has established that many organisational arrangements are not necessarily formed 
based on efficiency considerations only. Instead, some are also formed due to imitation, mere 
ceremony (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), or the fact that that they are widely shared, 
disseminated, and taken for granted throughout an organisational field (e.g. the construction 
industry) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
An empirical survey study of 87 professional construction clients in Sweden was conducted 
by Eriksson et al., (2008) to identify the critical barriers to partnering; and to analyse the 
correlations between clients' perceptions of these barriers, and their actual behaviour in the 
form of procurement procedures. The study found that the clients' desired objective of 
increasing cooperation between project parties does not affect their procurement procedures. 
Clients perceive partnering and cooperative arrangements to be significant and beneficial, but 
still heavily rely on the use of procurement procedures that foster competition and adversarial 
relationships. The authors offered two possible explanations for these contradictory results. 
First, that clients may not be aware of how their procurement decisions and procedures may 
affect their likelihoods of creating a cooperative environment (Eriksson et al., 2008), and thus 
impact on project performance and outcomes. Secondly, that clients may not be incentivised 
enough to adapt less familiar procurement arrangements that are potentially more efficient 
than conventional approaches (Eriksson et al., 2008).  
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This lack of incentive for the use of partnering or other collaborative modalities (i.e. lean 
construction) has been attributed by scholars to several factors such as: lack of adequate 
awareness and understanding and top management commitment (Erikkson et al., 2008; 
Sarhan and Fox, 2013), and the fact that the construction industry operates in a very 
competitively cost-driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). This issue could also 
be linked to the phenomena described by Bresnen and Haslam (1991) as "habituation", which 
occurs as experienced clients establish a 'close-minded' approach to building, thereby merely 
utilizing those procurement procedures that are most familiar to them (Love et al., 1998). 
Additionally, it could be argued that many clients conform to imperfect conventional 
procurement procedures, due to institutional pressure imposed on them (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Sarhan et al., 2017). Most construction clients are inexperienced or one-off 
procurers of construction projects (Love et al., 2010); and as such, they invariably rely on 
professional advice from consultants, financiers and legal advisers. These professional 
advisers may have a vested interest (i.e. social and/or economic motivations) for the wide-
spread use of specific procurement arrangements that may be inefficient in comparison to 
other newer alternatives (Pasquire et al., 2015). 
 
Apart from purely economic-based determinants, very few studies in the construction 
management literature have been conducted to investigate the role played by institutional 
determinants in predicting the establishment of project-organisational arrangements, of which 
partnering as a collaborative procurement system is one. To fill this gap, Phua (2006) carried 
out a survey study completed by 526 firms covering various industry disciplines in Hong 
Kong, in order to shed some empirical light on the reason for the apparent limited use of 
partnering arrangements in the construction industry. More specifically, the study focussed 
on investigating whether using an institutional framework could help to provide some useful 
explanations as to when partnering is likely to occur. Compellingly, the findings have shown 
that institutional forces far outweigh the significance of economic forces in determining 
whether or not firms will adopt partnering. It was found that none of the financial incentives 
in terms of increased profitability, competitiveness or likelihood of increased resource 
acquisition and reallocation had any significant impact on firms’ decisions to adopt 
partnering at all. Instead, the results showed that the majority of construction firms have not 
adopted partnering as an alternative to traditional procurement methods, due to the lack of 
strong institutional partnering norms in the industry. According to Phua (2006, p.622): 
 
"Because the benefits or more precisely the economic and management advantages 
that firms could gain from using partnering are still debatable and difficult to 
measure, there is no a priori reason to expect firms to favour its use over other 
procurement methods other than the fact that there are obvious institutional norms 
that propel firms to use it". 
 
The premise of institutional theory is that individual (i.e. persons) and collective (i.e. 
organisations) social actors are expected to comply with institutional forces imposed on them, 
because those that conform 'are rewarded through increased legitimacy, resources, and 
survival capabilities’ (Scott, 1987, p. 498).  When the same institutional forces continue to 
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exist over time, firms within relatively circumscribed fields that are bounded by shared 
understandings and mutual dependence (Scott, 2012) become more homogenous (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983); and thus a dominant organisational arrangement, or 'proto-institution' 
(Lawrence et al., 2002), is likely to occur (Phua, 2006). Thus, as a corollary, it is argued that 
the extent to which actors are inclined to the use of imperfect procurement arrangements (e.g. 
traditional procurement systems), that are deemed to be inefficient in comparison to other 
more innovative and collaborative approaches, is a function of how deeply entrenched the 
institutional environment is with respect to rules, technologies, norms, beliefs and 
expectations that are associated with the concerned practices. Having considered the factors 
that influence the emergence of organisational arrangements; as well as the impact of 
procurement systems, as institutional arrangements, on project-team performance and 
outcomes, the focus now shifts to an introduction of institutional theory and subsequently an 
exploration of neo-institutional theory. 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
Institutional theory has a long and complex history dating back to the mid-nineteenth century 
and incorporates the pioneering insights of seminal scholars of the social sciences such as 
Max Webber (Scott, 2005). Old institutional arguments relied on notions that ‘institutional 
contexts structure action’. According to Meyer (2008) ‘Individuals were seen as creatures of 
habit groups as controlled by customs and societies as organized around culture’ (p. 790). 
Theories stretched from the economic to political and religious fields, emphasising more 
organisational or cultural forms of control. However, in general, the nature of institutions and 
their forms of control over action were always subject to a lack of clarity and consensus in 
social scientific thinking (Meyer, 2008). 
 
The old institutionalism was encountered by constant debates about free will and 
determinism; as it saw humans, groups and organisations as naturally embedded entities in 
broad cultural and structural contexts. In brief, the old institutionalism was marginalised by 
the rise of the social sciences of modernity, where conceptions were built around notions of 
society being comprised of empowered, fairly rational, and rather free actors (Meyer, 2008). 
These actors include individuals, governments, and the organisations created by people and 
governments. In addition, much of the work focused on institutionalism from these periods 
was subsumed in the storming advances of neoclassical theory in economics, behaviouralism 
in political science, and positivism in sociology. Further development by John Meyer and his 
colleagues at Stanford University led to a significant revival for the ideas of institutionalism 
from 1977, with the formulation of neo-institutional theory (Scott, 2005; 2008). 
 
NEO-INSTITUTIONAL THEORY  
The neo-institutional theory developed in response to specific processes and structures (i.e. 
causes of structural change in organisations) that were not adequately explained by prevailing 
rational-actor and contingency theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Mahalingam and 
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Levitt, 2007). For example, bureaucratic organisations continued to follow rules that in some 
cases conflicted with the organisations’ own goals. The general argument advanced by the 
foundational work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) was that formal organisational structures 
reflected institutional forces instead of technological requirements and resource 
dependencies. They argued that many of the models giving rise to organisations are based on 
rationalised myths and rule-like frameworks that depend for their efficacy on imitation and 
the fact that they are widely shared and disseminated.  
 
In brief, conventional neo-institutionalism literature, in replication of the old institutionalism, 
emphasised the ways by which institutions constrained and directed people (now perceived as 
bounded, purposive and empowered actors) to behave in certain regular, relatively rational, 
but homogeneous and expected ways (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). With more than 30 years 
of progress since neo-institutional theory penetrated organisational sociology, the theory has 
been subject to various developments including reformulation of some of its arguments. Next, 
three significant areas of development, which are most relevant to the study, will be briefly 
highlighted (for a fuller review, see Scott, 2008). 
 
Institutional Isomorphism 
 
In the 1970s, when research efforts were focussed on understanding the reasons for variations 
amongst the kind (i.e. structural features) of organisations, seminal work by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) sought to explain homogeneity of organisations and practices rather than their 
variations. Their contention was that: "Highly structured organisation fields provide a 
context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often 
lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, and output" (p. 144). They 
described this phenomenon as institutional isomorphic change, which occurs through three 
mechanisms:  
(1) ‘Coercive isomorphism’ that results from political forces and legitimacy issues;  
(2) ‘Mimetic isomorphism’ occurring due to standard responses to uncertainty; and 
(3) ‘Normative isomorphism’ associated with professionalisation.  
 
Organisational fields can be defined as those independent actors (i.e. persons and 
organisations), within somewhat circumscribed arenas, that produce similar services or 
products and constitute a shared culture and social sub-system (Scott, 2008, 2012). The logic 
for applying work at organisational field levels is that it provides us with a more systematic 
level of analysis; as attention is shifted from focussing merely on 'organisations in 
environments' to focussing on the 'organisation of the environment', with particular 
consideration to organisations as the key players of the field (Scott, 2008).  
 
 
* Corresponding author: Ssarhan@lincoln.ac.uk 
Institutional Pillars and Carriers 
Institutional theory has been widely employed among social, economic and political sciences 
to examine systems ranging from micro-interpersonal interactions to macro global 
frameworks. Despite the fact that the theory had multiple roots; there is a wide consensus that 
institutions matter (Peng et al., 2009). Nevertheless, social scholars in various ways were 
adopting the theory, and there seemed to be a crucial need to move from a looser to a tighter 
conceptualisation. For this reason, iconic sociologist W. Richard Scott provided a 
comprehensive conceptual schema (see Table 2), based on his extensive survey to 
institutional literature, that guides directions for pursuing such a theory. Scott defined 
institutions as: ‘regulative, normative, and cultural/cognitive systems and structures that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life’ 
(Scott, 2001, p. 48). His aim was not to provide a new integrated theory of institutions, but 
instead to better enable us to capture both the commonality and the diversity of past and 
present conceptions of institutional theory (Scott, 2008).  
 
Table 2: Scott’s Typology of Institutional Pillars and Carriers (Scott, 2001) 
Pillars 
Carriers Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Symbolic 
Systems 
Rules, laws Values, expectations 
Categories, 
typifications, schema 
Relational 
Systems 
Governance & power 
systems 
Regimes, authority 
systems 
Structural 
isomorphism identities 
Routines 
Protocols, Standard 
Operating Procedures 
Jobs, roles, obedience 
to duty 
Scripts 
Artifacts 
Objects complying with 
mandated specifications 
Objects meeting 
conventions, standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
 
Hence legitimacy is a primary requisite of any stable social order, the three pillars are 
analytically distinguished to stress that although interrelated, but they work through varying 
mechanisms and distinctive motives for compliance (Scott, 2012). For instance, a 'regulative' 
perspective evaluates legitimacy according to the extent that systems operate in conformance 
to relevant legal or quasi-legal requirements. Alternatively, a 'normative' view asserts a moral 
basis for evaluating legitimacy; while a cultural-cognitive conception refers to the orthodox 
and taken for granted features of social life that widely shared beliefs within a community 
make possible (Scott, 2012). 
Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressure 
 
Institutional theory pays significant attention to the context. It considers the processes by 
which structures including rules, norms, and routines become established as authoritative 
guidelines for social behaviour. Much of the early studies of institutional theory emphasised 
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that organisations and actors, operating within a specific context, were pressurised to conform 
to the requirements and constraints of their institutional environment (e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Organisations’ self-interested rewards obtained from conformance to these 
institutional forces include, for example, legitimacy, enhancing likelihood of survival, social 
support, stability, access to resources, acceptance in professions, and expedience to avoid 
questioning (Oliver, 1991). For these reasons, the prevalent language used was one of 
‘institutional effects’, thereby inferring a determinant ‘top-down’ argument (Scott, 2005).  
 
This unilateral perspective based on obedient organisations defocussed attentions of 
institutional scholars away from the fact that social structures are continuously modified by 
the individual and collective actions of social actors. Thus, according to Scott (2008), one of 
the important advances to the progress of institutional theory is the introduction of agented 
actors and accordingly the rise of interactive arguments, which suggest that ‘institutional 
processes’ can operate in both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’ directions. This was important 
because it allows us to also identify the social actors who held the widely shared beliefs, or 
were enforcing taken for granted norms (Scott, 2005). 
 
It was the seminal work of Oliver (1991) who affirmed the role of organisational self-interest 
and active agency within institutional contexts; by cleverly integrating resource-dependence 
predictions of organisational strategy with the more limited responses to institutional 
pressures that traditional institutional models provoked. She pointed out that although 
acquiescence to institutional processes is the most likely response by organisations and their 
leaders; strategic responses could range from passive to active resistance as follows: 
acquiescence; compromise; avoid; defy; and manipulate. Accordingly, organisational 
reactions to institutional pressure towards conformity will depend on five institutional 
antecedents (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Institutional antecedents of strategic responses (extracted from Oliver, 1991) 
 
Institutional 
Factor 
Research Question Predictive Dimensions 
Cause 
Why is the organisation being 
pressurised to conform to 
institutional rules or expectations? 
 Legitimacy or social fitness; 
 Efficiency or economic fitness 
Constituents 
Who is asserting the institutional 
pressure on the organisation? 
 Multiplicity of constituent 
demands; 
 Dependency on institutional 
constituents 
Content 
To what norms or requirements is 
the organisation being pressurised 
to conform? 
 Consistency with organisational 
goals; 
 Discretionary constituents 
imposed on the organisation; 
Control How or by what means are the  Legal coercion or enforcement; 
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institutional pressures being 
exerted? 
 Voluntary diffusion of norms; 
Context 
What is the environmental context 
within which institutional 
pressures are being exerted? 
 Environmental uncertainty; 
 Environmental interconnectedness 
 
INSTITUTIONAL WASTE WITHIN CONSTRUCTION  
Based on this study’s hypothesis—that there are systems, structural arrangements and 
cognitive undergirding assumptions that support and encourage wasteful activities in 
construction—and building on the seminal studies of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) 
institutional isomorphism, Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism, and Oliver’s (1991) 
topology of strategic responses; institutional waste is defined as:  
‘the regulative, normative, and cognitive-culture institutional processes which support 
and/or encourage wasteful activities, that the construction industry (organisation field) 
accedes to in the form of habitual, imitation or compliance; in order to achieve 
legitimacy, security and survival  at the price of production efficiency and 
effectiveness’.  
 
Effectiveness refers to the extent to which a right target is achieved with resources applied 
(i.e. value and client satisfaction). Efficiency is the evaluation of how economically the 
resources are utilised to meet client requirements, based on production flow perspectives 
(Koskela, 2000). By habitual, here, the study means: adhering to invisible, widely shared and 
taken for granted norms that have been historically repeated; by imitation: consciously or 
unconsciously mimicking what other more successful organisations do and strictly following 
imperfect advice from consulting firms and professional institutions; and by compliance: 
obeying imperfect institutional requirements. This could include imposing more control in 
contracts and structural arrangements, for example, as a response to problems of a lack of 
trust. To elaborate and demonstrate our definition within the context of construction, the 
following propositions have been formulated (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Conceptual model of construction procurement as institutional arrangements 
 
Proposition 1: The higher the degree of social legitimacy, stability, and/or survival capability 
conceived by social actors, to be attainable from acquiescence to imperfect institutional 
pressure, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within construction.  
An example of this could be the adherence of the construction industry to use short time-
frame and price-competitive tendering processes, as a widely shared and taken for granted 
practice, despite it being associated with many flawed risk assumptions and criticised cost 
estimations (Laryea, 2011). Adding to this, is the use of extensive, time consuming and 
unnecessarily expensive prequalification procedures (Hughes et al., 2001) in public projects,  
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e.g. questionnaires (PQQ), that may lead to wasteful activities such as cover-pricing. In 
particular, the use of PQQs for procuring projects below the European Union threshold 
(approximately £100,000) restrains many SMEs from applying for public contracts (i.e. waste 
of human potential) and substantially increases tendering costs and time (HM Government, 
2013). This also includes the textual complexity and unnecessary formality in contract 
wordings of some contract conditions (i.e. FIDIC, 1999 and NEC, 1993) that are very 
difficult to read, and require at least college-level reading skills to correctly interpret them 
(Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 2007; Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). It is important to 
emphasise here that lawyers and specialist surveyors are not the primary users of a contract; it 
is the project parties’ ability to capture their meaning which is fundamental for contract 
performance (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). 
 
Proposition 2: The higher the degree of financial benefit, protection and guarantee, and/or 
vested interest rationalised by social actors, to be attainable from conformance to imperfect 
institutional processes, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within 
construction.  
 
Examples of this include the heavily reliance of construction parties on the deep-rooted 
practice of using standard forms of contracts (Eriksson and Laan, 2007).  These safeguards 
bring with it lots of formality and rigidity that stifles cooperation and focuses on the 
individual parties and their responsibilities; thereby driving a distance between project parties 
and encouraging opportunistic behaviour (Cox and Thompson, 1997; Eriksson et al. 2008). 
Other examples include the traditional use of disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses in construction 
contracts (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003). This unfair risk allocation approach leads to 
increased costs of projects in the form of unnecessary contingencies and insurances (i.e. cost 
wastage), restricted bid-competitions (i.e. waste of human potential), and potential disputes 
(i.e. time waste). Similar imperfect procurement arrangements include the use of high rates of 
cash retentions on short contracts (Hughes et al., 2000); and requirements for performance 
bonds that are often disproportionate and may restrict SMEs aiming to bid for public 
contracts (HM Government, 2013). More obvious examples include architects' and quantity 
surveyors' biased preferences for the use of traditional lump-sum procurement systems with 
provisional quantities (Love et al., 1998). 
 
Proposition 3: The higher the degree of dependency of social actors on imperfect 
institutional processes, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within 
construction.  
 
An example of this could be organisations which depend on obtaining their funding through 
bank loans, and as a result may pay more attention to their funders’ requirements rather than 
their customers’ needs (Chiang and Cheng, 2010). Another example is clients' over-reliance 
on conventional insurance arrangements which add unnecessary costs to constructions 
projects and can also obstruct collaboration between supply chains (Ndekugri et al., 2013). 
This could also be associated with the way that clients’ advisors often set the ‘rules of the 
game’ (i.e. procurement type and construction periods stated in tenders) and then everyone 
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else has to work within these rules, which could sometimes be dysfunctional. This  dilemma 
is often a result of discrepancies in power that exist among major players in the industry and 
within project coalitions (Winch, 2000a). 
 
Proposition 4: The higher the degree of consistency of organisational goals and purposes 
with imperfect institutional pressures and norms, the greater the likelihood of waste to be 
institutionalised within construction.  
 
For instance, it’s not unusual for construction organisations, because of competitive pressure, 
to rely on making their profits solely through commercial processes and manipulating roles 
with others, rather than struggling to improve production efficiency (Zimina and Pasquire, 
2011b). As an interviewee in a study by Chiang and Cheng (2010) commented, contractors 
could only make profits, in this highly price-competitive industry, if they concentrated their 
efforts on three issues: (1) procurement of building materials; (2) cash flow management with 
their downstream supply chain; (3) planning for and application of claims. Thus, this suggests 
that it important, for further studies, to identify clients' and construction organisations' 
characteristics, strategies and tactics, that make them more or less obedient to imperfect 
institutional processes.. 
 
Proposition 5: The higher the degree of voluntary diffusion of imperfect institutional rules, 
routines or norms, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within 
construction.  
 
This is mainly associated with mimetic institutional waste. An example could be the 
imperfect norms, job duties and responsibilities diffused by professional institutions and trade 
associations, with which its members are requested to conform.  In such cases of very widely 
taken-for-granted understandings of what constitute genuine practices, it is highly likely that 
practitioners will conform because it does not occur to them to do otherwise (Oliver, 1991). 
Labour/trade unions are also powerful actors that influence the culture in the construction 
industry. They were identified in an empirical study by Eriksson et al. (2008) as industry 
barriers to change in general, and increased cooperation in specific, due to their conservative 
and defensive culture that encourages upholding of the status quo. An example of imperfect 
institutional pressure diffused by trade unions, as identified by Eriksson et al. (2008), was 
their requirement for fixed piece rates, regardless of time, for blue-collar workers, which in 
turn undermined collaboration between different crafts. Another example would include 
decision maker’s simply trying what others have found to work, for example traditional 
procurement, or critical path planning – push system technique (Koskela et al., 2014). 
 
Proposition 6: The higher the degree of environmental uncertainty, the greater the likelihood 
of waste to be institutionalised within construction.  
 
Environmental uncertainty in the construction industry can include, for e.g., fluctuations in 
the state of the economy comprised of factors such as inflation, changes to government 
macroeconomic policies and periods of instability of funding. Under such conditions, it is 
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more likely for organisations to adhere to imperfect institutional regulations, norms & 
requirements imposed on them by governmental management, funders, professional 
association and public media pressure for the sake of survival, legitimacy, and protection 
from environmental turbulence (Oliver, 1991). 
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The construction industry is often regarded as confrontational, risks averse, and lacking trust 
and capacity for innovation and improvement (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Rooke et al., 
2004; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Eriksson et al., 2008). It has been extensively criticised, in 
particular, for its short term “hit-and-run” relationships which are focused on win-lose 
situations. Generally, increased collaboration between project parties, to support production 
flow, has been argued to be a suitable remedy for many of the industry’s problems (Eriksson 
et al., 2008; Sarhan et al., 2015). Since, the extent of cooperation (and trust) is largely 
influenced by procurement arrangements and procedures (Sarhan et al., 2015, Eriksson and 
Laan, 2007); this is considered a key area that requires substantial attention and improvement 
(Egan, 1998) and which is central to overall client satisfaction and project success (Love et 
al., 1998; Tookey et al., 2001; Osipova and Eriksson, 2011). A small but emerging number of 
studies have attempted to investigate the relationship between procurement systems and 
waste in construction (e.g. Gamage et al., 2009). However, most of these studies, if not all, 
have limited their attention to material waste as opposed to process waste and value creation. 
Additionally, very few, if any waste-related studies, have sought to explore the influence of 
performance shaping mechanisms (i.e. institutional context in which human actions take 
place and decisions are made) within the construction procurement context. 
 
Hence, Construction business systems are regarded as institutions (Winch, 2000a&b; Sha, 
2004) that are created in countries to specify ‘the rules of the game’, and regulate the 
relations and interactions between the different parties involved in the industry. As a 
corollary, this study conceptualises procurement systems as institutional arrangements that 
are designed to assign liabilities and authorities to people and organizations at the programme 
and project levels; and thus structure the boarders that shape the play of the game. According 
to economic institutionalists, there are at least three types of influences that institutions, 
whether formal (e.g. rules and regulations) or informal (e.g. norms), have on behaviour 
(Dequesh, 2002, Phua, 2006): 
 Constraints on behaviour in the form of rules and regulations and set of procedures to 
detect deviations from the rules and regulations, and set of moral and ethical norms 
that define the boarders that confine the way in which the rules and regulations are 
specified and enforcement is carried out  (i.e. restrictive function);  
 Influence on perception or reception of reality (ie. informational-cognitive function);  
 Influence on end goals that people pursue (i.e motivational or teleological function). 
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From an economic perspective, it is easy to understand why economic actors are more likely 
to conform to institutional forces, as this will be based on obvious cost and efficiency-based 
considerations; and also due to the prevailing 'norms that provide "legitimacy" to a set of 
rules' (North, 1994, p. 366). However, the social perspective argues that the compliance with 
institutional processes is not necessarily based on efficiency considerations. Instead, 
conformance is principally based on social legitimacy drivers (Scott, 2012). The compliance 
with norms, beliefs and regulations is regarded important, because it allows those who 
comply with them to gain increased legitimacy, survival capability, social support, stability, 
access to resources, acceptance in professions, and expedience to avoid questioning (Oliver, 
1991, Scott, 2005).  
 
Despite the distinctive differences underpinning each of these two perspectives, an 
overarching assumption common to both is that people and organisations are seen as rational, 
purposive and empowered, albeit bounded, actors whose behaviours and decisions are 
constrained by the influence of the institutional pressure imposed on them (Phua, 2006). Scott 
(2012) has argued that the concepts employed in contingency and resource-based studies are 
relatively limited when compared to neo-institutional theory of social and organisational 
studies, as they direct main attention to governments and regulatory systems; thereby 
neglecting the equally important roles played by normative and cultural–cognitive systems. 
Similarly, the authors of this study believe that institutional concepts used in economic-based 
studies (e.g. Williamson, 2000), overlook, or at least give less attention to, normative and 
cultural–cognitive systems, that are vital forces affecting the success of construction projects 
(Scott, 2012). Hence, the construction industry is very labour-intensive/oriented, it seems to 
us therefore that neo-institutional theory is more suitable and powerful for construction 
management studies in general, and this study in specific. 
 
The fact that much of the waste produced in construction is common to many projects led to 
the study's hypothesis that there are imperfect institutional regulations, norms, and cultural -
cognitive framework assumptions within the construction procurement context, which 
support and/or encourage wasteful activities. Examples of these include: traditional lump-
sum procurement systems based on price-competitive tendering (Winch, 2000b; Love et al., 
2011b; Laryea and Hughes, 2008; Mohammed et al., 2011); silo thinking and resistance to 
change such that existing values and beliefs are not open for questioning (Winch, 2000a; 
Eriksson et al., 2008); traditional insurance products (Kent and Becerik Gerber, 2010; 
Ndekugri et al., 2013); textual complexity of standard contracts (Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 
2007; Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013), disclaimer clauses (Zaghloul & Hartman, 2003; Love 
et al., 2010); late payments (Poverbs, 2000; Hughes, 2000),); the short-term focus as 
exemplified by clients’ habit of changing suppliers between projects through the frequent use 
of open bid invitation procedures (Erikkson et al, 2008).  
Many of these imperfect procurement arrangements and assumptions are common in 
construction projects, leading to frequent unsatisfactory outcomes. It is thus questionable why 
conventional procurement systems remain very prevalent, as opposed to newer and more 
collaborative forms of procurement that are deemed to be more beneficial and efficient. This 
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is a valid fundamental question hence there are substantial trends towards establishing 
cooperative ways of working as a means for improving project performance and outcomes. 
Previous research has provided different explanations which helped to partially explain the 
reason for this contradiction between clients' desires and actions. These included the fact that 
the construction industry operates in a very competitively cost-driven environment (Bresnen 
and Marshall, 2000). In a study by Eriksson et al. (2008), it was suggested that clients lack 
the incentives for the use of partnering due to inadequate awareness and understanding of 
how their procurement procedures influence their likelihoods of creating a cooperative 
environment. Other reasons suggested by them included lack of top management 
commitment and resistance to change. Similarly, Brensen and Haslam (1991) linked this to 
the "habituation" phenomenon that occurs as experienced clients establish a 'close-minded' 
approach to building, thereby merely utilizing those procurement procedures that are most 
familiar to them (Love et al., 1998). Phua (2006) attributed this to the lack of dominating 
industry norms that advocate the use of partnering (e.g. government policies and guidelines, 
technologies, beliefs and expectations).  
 
Additionally, it could be argued that many clients conform to imperfect conventional 
procurement procedures, due to institutional pressure imposed on them (Sarhan et al., 2015). 
Most of the clients, who procure construction projects, lack experience and may only ever 
build once or twice (Love et al., 2010). Thus, they invariably rely on taking professional 
advice from consultants, financiers, and legal advisers. These actors who are relatively 
powered than other (winch, 2000a), may have a vested interest (i.e. social and/or economic 
motivations) for the wide-spread use of some imperfect procurement arrangements; thereby 
dictating the rules of the game - the way we do business (Sarhan et al., 2015). When 
imperfect procurement (institutional) arrangements prevail they restrict and govern the way 
that project partners behave and interact, leading to common and repeated unsatisfactory 
outcomes (see Figure 3).  
 
Due to the one-off nature of many construction projects and the short-term focus 
characterising many construction clients and decision-makers, there are less opportunities for 
learning from project outcomes. Let alone, that the construction industry, as an organisational 
field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), is particularly characterized by its high levels of 
complexity and industry specific uncertainties and interdependences (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002). Accordingly, this study argues that imperfect institutional forces that surround the 
construction procurement environment lead to more legitimacy and/or use of risk-averse 
safeguarding approaches in procurement (Sarhan et al., 2017), which deter attention away 
from core-efficiency purposes; thereby restricting value creation and possibly decreasing 
revenues for all project parties. When the same or similar (imperfect) institutional pressures 
continue over time, isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) will lead to (inefficient) 
construction procurement arrangements becoming more homogeneous, and as a result, 
standardised patterns of behaviour and common project outcomes are most likely to occur. 
These arguments are supported by Winch (2000a) who stressed, albeit through a relatively 
limited economic insight that: 
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"Just as patterns of behaviour become institutionalized so that they act back upon the 
actors through the process of structuration (Giddens, 1984), the rules of the game 
come to be seen as given, normal, the only way to do things. Careers and status 
become dependent upon certain rules; threats to those rules become personal 
attacks". (p. 90) 
 
Work by Sarhan et al. (2016) discussed the factors influencing the ‘Principal-Agent’ 
relationship in construction, demonstrating that institutional forces (i.e. vested interests and 
bargaining strength of major industry players) can have an influence on shaping procurement 
practices. Their study used the UK’s Highways Agency transformation into Highways 
England, as a practical example of how construction models and procurement practices often 
mirror institutional factors. According to them, this transformation and change in the status of 
the principal has led to change in rules and procurement practices in the UK highways sector. 
This included, for example, a movement from the deployment of large integrated ‘manage 
and maintain’ contracts towards fragmenting contracts in order to secure greater control and 
visibility of costs.  
 
A subsequent study by Sarhan et al. (2017) identified and critically evaluated a number of 
imperfect taken for granted safeguarding techniques (Table 4) in construction procurement, 
which stifle cooperation and entrench wasteful processes across the supply chain and 
throughout the project. According to them, these imperfect procurement arrangements 
dominate the management of the project delivery often to the detriment of the project itself; 
but because there is a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients and decision makers feel 
they have taken the best course of action. Thus, these imperfect safeguarding practices, based 
on mal-applied transactional considerations, was described by them as a source of 
institutionalised waste in construction. They argued that ‘self-interest’ (as a cultural/cognitive 
institutional factor) drives opportunism and influences governance approaches, leading to a 
dichotomy as one organisation seeks to protects its interests from the opportunism of others 
whist continuing to exploit all opportunities. Interestingly, their study urged us to focus our 
attention towards institutional factors influencing the choice of imperfect procurement 
arrangements, as they are the ‘root causes’ for many of the wastes we encounter at the 
supply-chain level. 
Table 4: A categorisation of various safeguarding approaches in construction procurement 
(Sarhan et al., 2017) 
 
Prevalent  safeguarding approaches based 
on 'risk allocation' considerations 
Less prevalent safeguarding approaches 
based on 'process flow' considerations 
Standard forms of contract Relational contracting 
Use of Disclaimer/Exculpatory clauses Shared risks and rewards 
Traditional insurance arrangements/products Single project insurance  
Collateral warranties Latent defects insurance 
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This study builds on the work of Sarhan et al. (2016 and 2017) to provide explanations as to 
how that an imperfect institutional environment can lead to inferior construction procurement 
arrangements, which may cause transaction and production losses (i.e. waste). In general, 
increased trustful collaboration between project parties, to support and enhance production 
flow, is argued to be an appropriate remedy for many of the industry’s problems (see e.g. 
Eriksson et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Sebastian, 2011; Walker et al., 2017). The adoption of 
collaborative procurement approaches can help to align interests and eliminate much of the 
waste embedded in construction processes; however, arguably, the prevailing imperfect 
institutional factors and mind-sets are pinning the wasteful system in place. The conceptual 
model (Figure) and guiding propositions provided in this study could act as a primary step for 
unpicking the coherence and yet wastefulness of the current construction business models. 
This approach resonates with Matos-Castano’s (2014) assertion that providing an enabling 
environment for newer and more collaborative construction business and procurement models 
entails a combination of changing existing institutions relating to project procurement and 
creating supporting institutions that build trustful collaboration between and among 
stakeholders, as opposed to merely creating institutions to provide legitimacy to public sector 
decision makers. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The prevailing understanding of waste, arguably, encourages the improvement of current 
processes rather than fundamental system redesign. Obtaining a better understanding and 
conceptualisation of waste in construction is therefore becoming more crucial to prepare the 
industry for the radical change demanded. Certainly, one aspect of this change is 
consideration of the wider institutional, organisational, and commercial environments that 
surround the design and delivery of construction projects. Institutions influence beliefs, 
norms and actions; thus they shape performance and outcomes. However, this study found 
that the concept of institutions is not well established in construction management and 
economics research, specifically in waste-related literature. An overall analysis of the concept 
of waste in construction, revealed that very few, if any, studies have sought to consider the 
influence of the commercial and institutional context on pinning the prevailing wasteful 
system in place. 
 
This study has offered a novel perspective to the generation and persistence of waste in 
construction projects by introducing the concept of 'Institutional Waste' within the 
construction procurement context. The study has also exemplified various taken-for-granted 
rules, norms and meanings that impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction. 
Based on a thorough review of construction-procurement literature, using neo-institutional 
theory as an analytical lens, the study stressed that construction procurement arrangements 
and practices are shaped by institutional structures, beliefs and attitudes as well as project 
characteristics. The study also demonstrated how that an imperfect institutional environment 
influences construction procurement arrangements, thereby contributing to the generation of 
institutionalised wastes in construction projects. Having provided a conceptual framework, 
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the six propositions developed, within this study, lend themselves to empirical testing. The 
underlying premise of this study is that if we can understand the detailed ‘institutional causes’ 
of coherence for the prevailing construction business models and reveal the consequential 
waste, then the adoption of more efficient and collaborative business and project delivery 
models may become more widespread. 
 
The scope of this study is limited to commercial buildings, industrial construction and 
infrastructure projects in the UK. However, with an exception to the varying regulative 
context within different countries, it could be argued that the construction culture and norms 
of practice are relatively universal (Rooke et al., 2003). Thus, the concept of ‘institutional 
waste’ has the potential to be generalised across the whole construction industry worldwide. 
Future studies are encouraged to assess the concept’s compatibility, relevance and 
significance to other sectors and industries. 
 
The findings presented in this study provide a theoretical anchor and rationale for future re-
shaping of the roles and responsibilities of the professions and wider participants involved 
within the construction sector, in order to increase the production effectiveness of the 
industry. Future studies are also recommended to gain a better understanding of the clients' 
and major players' characteristics, strategies and tactics, that make them more or less obedient 
to imperfect institutional and commercial pressure. In that way, this can help clients and 
decision makers to be aware of the institutional factors affecting the choice of their 
procurement procedures, and thus their desired project outcomes. Also, it could enable them 
to consider the adoption of newer contractual and project-organisational techniques that could 
be of more value to them.  
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Appendix 1: A snapshot of Table of information developed for literature review purposes 
Study Research Method Main aim(s) of the study Imperfections within the construction procurement context 
Tookey et al. 
(2001) 
A questionnaire based 
on Masterman’s 
(1994) procurement 
contentions for 
assessment of 
procurement choice. 
The study targeted a 
sample of 12 projects 
giving permission for 
the research team to 
gather data. An 
approach of elite 
interviewing was used 
targeting critical 
decision makers on the 
projects  
To identify whether clients 
follow prescriptive 
procurement guidelines 
provided by academics for 
selection of  appropriate 
procurement system 
 Clients’ over-reliance on professional advice given to 
them by consultants, which may be biased, misleading or 
based on vested interest; 
 The existing approach to procurement selection which is 
based on tender cost and (imperfect) contract type 
dictating organisational structure. For example, ‘Too 
many clients [use] Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) 
contracts even if [inappropriate]’ (Contracts Journal, 
2000) – This selection of use is often based on imitation 
rather than efficiency reasons. As a consequence of this 
choice, the (imperfect) contract type dictates the project-
organisational structure which governs the way functions 
interact during product development. 
Wordley 
(1991) 
Literature review/ 
opinion based 
To examine the respective 
concepts of both collateral 
warranties and Latent defects 
insurance with a view to 
highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of each 
arrangement. 
 Collateral warranties – vagaries of litigation together with 
its transactional cost, delay and substantial demands on 
management time; uncertainty about the performance of 
the asset backing the warranty; increases the overall cost 
of the insurance on any one project; hinders collaboration 
and encourages disputes 
Eriksson et 
al. (2008) 
A survey study of 87 
professional 
construction clients in 
Sweden. 
To identify critical barriers to 
partnering, as perceived by 
construction clients, and the 
specific measures that are 
taken to overcome them 
during implementation. 
 Cultural barriers to partnering/cooperation as identified 
from literature: 
o Short term focus – is accentuated by the clients’ 
habit of changing suppliers between projects 
through the frequent use of open bid invitation 
procedures 
o Adversarial attitudes - Win-lose situations 
o Conservative industry culture - existing values and 
beliefs are not open for questioning 
o Lack of sub-supplier involvement in specification 
 
 Organisational barriers to partnering/ cooperation: 
o Focus on project outcomes instead of processes 
o Traditional organisation of the construction process 
(e.g. sequential processes) 
o Traditional procurement procedures – e.g. The focus 
on lowest price in bid evaluation 
o New competence requirements 
 
 Industrial barriers to partnering/cooperation: 
o Trade/Labour Unions - have a conservative and 
defensive culture that inhibits change and 
encourages maintenance of the status quo (Craft, 
1991). An example from the Swedish construction 
industry is their requirement for piecework rates 
(fixed piece rate for each unit produced or action 
performed regardless of time) for blue-collar 
workers that do not encourage collaboration 
between different crafts 
o Deep-rooted practice of using standard contracts 
established by third parties - bring a formality that 
stifles good relationships, and focus on the 
individual parties and their responsibilities, thereby 
driving a distance between them 
o Laws and regulations (no specific examples were 
provided within the study) 
 
Note: by using Principal component factor analysis (PCFA), 
labour unions loaded more on the cultural barrier factor than on 
the expected industrial barrier factor. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
e.g. 
Accidents, 
Delay, waiting, Rework 
Over-ordered materials 
Damaged  materials 
Multiple handling of 
materials 
Making-Do 
Poor payment systems 
Duplicate insurance cover 
Settling disputes after PC 
Tendering 
Procuring services on cost 
What 
 the 
customer 
wants 
What we have to do to 
enable us to create what 
the customer wants 
e.g. 
Procurement 
Taxes 
Insurance 
Logistics 
Accounting 
Cost estimating 
Commercial management 
- for clarification see: 
Zimina & Pasquire (2011) 
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Figure 2 
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Procurement subsystems/procedures include: 
Procurement Systems 
Conventional Delivery Approaches Non-conventional Delivery Approaches 
Separated methods (i.e. 
Design-Bid-Build) 
 
Integrated methods (i.e. Design 
& Build and its variants) 
 
E.g. Partnering 
E.g. Alliancing 
Management-oriented methods (i.e. Construction 
Management, Management Contracting, Design 
and Manage 
E.g. PPP/PFI 
E.g. IPD system 
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